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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
causes should and in the near future probably will apply to such situa-
tions. Under this law, the courts would consider the magnitude of the
risk involved, and even though the defect is discoverable, the con-
tractor would be responsible if he could reasonably forsee that the
intermediate party would fail to inspect the work for defects. It is
anticipated that the general rule will eventually be that a contractor is
to be relieved of liability for injuries to third parties only when he is
not at fault in creating the situation. DAVID L. WALTHER
Constitutional Law: Health Inspections Without a Warrant-
An inspector of the Baltimore City Health Department, acting on a
complaint of rodent infestation, inspected the area to determine its
source. He discovered a pile, later identified as, "rodent feces mixed
with straw and trash and debris to approximately half a ton," in the
rear of petitioner's house. Although he had no warrant to gain entry,
the inspector sought permission to inspect the basement area .The peti-
tioner refused. Therefore, the following afternoon the petitioner was
arrested and found guilty of refusing entry to a health inspector in
violation of Section 120 of Article 12 of the Baltimore City Code.1
The petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the
grounds that Section 120 denied him due process of law as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amedment in that it violated the search and seizure
clause of the Fourth Amendment. Held: The conviction was affirmed
in a five-four decision. 2
The court recognized that "the 'security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police' is fundamental to a free society and
as such protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, ' 3 but went on to
say: "Application of the broad restraints of due process compels in-
quiry into the nature of the demand being made upon individual free-
dom in a particular context and the justification of social need on
which the demand rests."
4
Examing the background of the constitutional amendments, the
Court declared that two protections emerged from the Fourth Amend-
ment.5 The first of these is the right to personal privacy-the right to
be secure from intrusions without proper authority of law. The second
is "self-protection"-the right to be secure from searches for evidence
1 Baltimore, Md., Code Art. 12, §120: "Whenever the Commissioner of Health
shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or en-
closure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and if the owner or
occupier shall refuse or delay the same and admit a free examination, he
shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal or delay the sum of Twenty
Dollars."
2 Frank v. -Maryland, 79 S.Ct. 804 (1959).
3 Id. at 807, citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1948).
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at 808.
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to be used in criminal actions without a judicially issued search war-
rant.6 The Court concluded that "it was on the issue of the right to be
secure from searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions
or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was
fought."' 7 Thus, the traditional restrictions against searches and sei-
zures did not apply to the constitutional right of privacy, and this right
must then be weighed against the state's obligation to protect the health
of the community. Considering the importance of control over sanitary
conditions and the fact situation under which the demand for entry
was made, the Court then decided that the petitioner's claim to privacy
had to give way to this exercise of the state's police power.
It appears to be rather doubtful whether the dispensation of the
warrant requirement is justified in this case on the grounds of protect-
ing the public health. There has been a growing tendency to allow
greater latitude in the exercise of the police power in this area, but this
has been in exceptional situations which required instant action by
health authorities.8 Certainly it is difficult to conclude that the slight
delay in procuring a warrant to inspect a private dwelling, involved
such a functional hinderance in an emergency so as to dispense with a
constitutional safeguard.
Perhaps then a constitutional analysis of the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment to the
states, would indicate the foundation upon which the Frank decision
rests. The Fourth Amendment was written in a period of general war-
rants and writs of assistence, and declared that unreasonable searches
and seizures were prohibited. After asserting the principle that the
Fourth Amendment was to be liberally construed to prevent impair-
ment of its protections,9 the Court decided that no test of reasonable-
ness could be formulated in rigid and absolute terms, but rather in each
case, reasonableness had to be determined from the facts and circum-
r See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946): "The law of searches
and seizures as revealed in the decisions of this Court is the product of the
interplay of these two [Fourth and Fifth Amendments] constitutional provi-
sions... It reflects a dual purpose - protection of the privacy of the indi-
vidual, his right to be left alone; protection of the individual against com-
pulsory production of evidence to be used against him."
7 Frank v. Maryland, supra note 2, at 808.
8 See Annot., 25 A.L.R. 2d 1415 (1952) (Requiring submissions to physical
examinations) ; Annot., 43 A.L.R. 2d 453 (1955) (Sanctioning the chemical
treatment of public water supply); Annot. 22 A.L.R. 2d 774 (1952) (Ap-
proving health regulations regarding tourist and trailer camps) ; Annot. 140
A.L.R. 127 (1942) (The power to require closing of places of amusement
or other places of public assembly because of fire hazard or unsanitary condi-
tions); and Annot., 121 A.L.R. 732 (1939) (Validating of statutes, ordi-
nances, and other regulations relating to the transportation or disposal of
carcasses of dead animals).
s Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) ; United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) ; Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932):
and Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
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stances. 10 The requirement that reasonableness be determined by the
judiciary in the issuance of warrants was waived only in circumstances
of extreme impracticality. Meanwhile, the Court struck down attempt-
ed invasions of the Fourth Amendment's sacred rights with strong
language."
However, the Fourteenth Amendment did not automatically incor-
porate all the principles of the Fourth Amendment.12 Yet the basic
protection-security of one's privacy-was declared to be embraced by
the Fourteenth Amendment."3 Therefore, the Court could state: "Ac-
cordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirma-
tively to sanction such police intrusion into privacy it would run count-
er to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. '14 How then is this
affirmative sanction of the intrusion of one's privacy justified in Frank
v. Maryland?
The answer may be found in the judicial disagreement in the feder-
al courts over the scope of the Fourth Amendment. The question is
whether the search and seizure clause applies to both criminal and civil
proceedings. Since the issue is more sharply defined in the lower courts,
perhaps the problem can better be understood by beginning there.
As early as 1869, the Fourth Amendment was unequivocally de-
clared to apply only to criminal prosecutions.15 In 1949, this position
was challenged by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in the case of District of Columbia v. Little.'6 An issue,
similar to that of the Frank case was raised, namely, the right of a
1o Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, supra, note 9; and Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
11 "The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is, in itself, unreasonable
and abhorrent to our laws." Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
Accord, Harris v. United States, supra, note 10, at 150, citing Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921): "This Court has consistently as-
serted that the rights of privacy and personal security protected by the Fourth
Amendment '. . . are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional
liberty; and that the guaranty of them is important and as imperative as are
the guarantees of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen.'"
12 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13 Wolf v. Colorado, supra, note 3.
14 Id. at 28.
15 "The objection made to the power given to the supervisor by the statute is, as
here just mentioned, that it is forbidden by the fourth amendment to the
constitution. But this is a civil proceeding, and in no wise does it partake of
the character of a criminal prosecution; no offense is charged against Mead-
ors. Therefore in this proceeding, the fourth amendment is not violated."
In re AMleador, 16 Fed. Cas. 1294, 1298-1299 (No. 9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869).
Accord, In re Strouse, 23 Fed. Cas. 261, 261-262 (No. 13548) (D. Nev. 1871) :
"Upon the second ground that this requirement to produce the books is an
unreasonable search, it need only be remarked that the fourth amendment,
supposed to be violated, like the clause of the fifth referred to above, is
applicable to criminal cases only." Cf. United States v. 62 Packages, Etc., 48
F. Supp. 878, 884 (W.D. Wis. 1943): "The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not apply to a seizure process in civil actions. The
sections of the act here in question do not provide for unreasonable searches
and seizures. This is a civil action as distinguished from a criminal action."
16 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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health official to inspect the premises for unsanitary conditions without
a warrant and over the protests of the occupant . The Court concluded
that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to both civil and criminal
situations, and was not limited solely to criminal actions as was the
Fifth Amendment which prohibits self-incrimination. Therefore, the
search of a private home without a warrant for the purpose of pro-
tecting the public health was not distinguishable from the search for
the purpose of gathering evidence of crime. The justification for this
position is the interpretation that the constitutional prohibition of the
Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches is a derivation of
the common law right to privacy in one's home. Indeed, the Little
decision appears to be an attempt to clarify the words of Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson: "Although the IVth Amendment was written against
the background of the general warrants in England and the writs of
assistence in the American colonies," it "gives a protection far greater
than those abuses."' s
The limitation on the scope of the search and seizure clause has
been previously implied by the Supreme Court itself. In deciding the
constitutionality of a civil statute in the case of Boyd v. United States,
the Court said:
Reverting then to the particular phraseology of the Act and to
the information in the present case, which is founded on it, we
have to deal with an Act which expressly excludes criminal pro-
ceedings from its operation, although embracing civil suits for
penalties and forfeitures, and with an information not techni-
cally a criminal proceeding, and neither, therefore, within the
literal terms of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution any
more than it is within the literal terms of the Fourth. 9
The Frank decision now represents a further step toward restrict-
ing the Fourth Amendment, as applied through the Fourteenth, to
criminal proceedings only. As Mr. Justice Douglas stated: "We wit-
ness indeed an inquest over a substantial part of the Fourth Amend-
ment.... The Court now casts a shadow over the guarantee as respects
searches and seizures in civil cases. ' 20 By separating the Fourth
Amendment into a civil protection (personal privacy) and a criminal
protection (self-protection in criminal proceedings), the majority
allowed the civil safeguard to yield to the health inspection laws. This
implication is further strengthened by the Court's quotation from the
Boyd case which states that:
... the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the
fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
17Ibid.
18 Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F. 2d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
'9 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1885).
20 Frank v. Maryland, supra, note 2, at 812-813 (Dissent).
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compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; and com-
pelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,'
which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the
question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
21
Therefore, by impyling that the Fourth Amendment which regulates
federal action, applied only to criminal proceedings, the Court was
then able to decide that the civil health laws were likewise not protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amndment.
Coinciding with this constitutional trend, a new problem will pro-
bably present itself-the need for a clearer deliniation between civil
and criminal proceedings. The Boyd case, cited by the majority opinion
in the Frank decision, held that the proceedings involved, though civil
in name, were criminal in nature and that the Fourth Amendment was
still applicable to this "quasi criminal" action.2 2 Therefore, it is likely
that civil actions which provide for penalties and forfeitures, will be
given a "quasi criminal" label in order to secure the traditional pro-
tection of the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment as
embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment.
RICHARD C. NINNEMAN
Labor Law: Authority of Arbitrator to Determine Remedy for
Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement-The union sued un-
der Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act' for specific
performance of the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining
agreement. The basic grievance resulted from a foreman's denial to
an employee of four hours' overtime work to which the employee
was allegedly entitled by reason of his job classification. The com-
pany offered to give the aggrieved employee four hours' overtime
work but refused, in accordance with its established policy, to pay
for work not performed. The company proposal was unsatisfactory
to the union, which invoked arbitration. The company agreed to
arbitrate the issue of whether a contract violation occurred, pro-
vided that the remedy for the violation be the subject of negotiation
between the company and the union and not fixed by the arbitrator.
On appeal to the court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held: com-
21 Id. at 808, citing Boyd v. United States, supra, note 19, at 633.
22 "We are also clearly of the opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose
of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses com-
mitted by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature crimi-
nal .... The information, though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance
and fect a criminal one .... As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures,
incurred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi
criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal pro-
ceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution,
.. " Bovd v. United States, supra, note 19, at 633-634.
'61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §185 (1952).
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